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NESTED ETHICS: A TALE OF TWO CULTURES 
Milton C. Regan, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As law firms have become larger and more complex,
1
 many of 
them have adopted more sophisticated programs to ensure that lawyers 
in the firm comply with their professional responsibilities.
2
 These 
programs attempt to achieve more consistent behavior across the firm by 
relying on specifically designated ethics experts who take the lead in 
establishing standard procedures that coordinate and reduce reliance on 
individual discretion.
3
 Aside from producing greater uniformity, such 
procedures also lessen reliance on the probity of individual lawyers. This 
reflects awareness of the powerful way that circumstances can shape 
behavior, particularly in large organizations. We can think of these 
procedures and policies as constituting the basic elements of a law firm’s 
ethical infrastructure. This term sometimes is used to encompass a 
broader set of initiatives, but for analytical purposes, I want to use it in 
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 1. “Law firms generally can be described as tending toward progressively formal 
management and internal specialization as firms move from smaller and collegial to larger, more 
bureaucratic forms.” Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical 
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 
694 (2002). [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure].  
 2. Id. at 692. 
 3. Id. at 706-07. 
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In recent years, organizations have come to appreciate that 
procedures and policies designed to promote ethical behavior may have 
limited effect if employees do not internalize the values that underlie 
them.
4
 Scholars suggest that organizations need to combine a focus on 
deterrence with an approach that emphasizes management’s 
commitment to ethical values.
5
 As Lynn Sharp Paine describes, these 
values “reflect important organizational obligations and widely shared 
aspirations that appeal to the organization’s members.”6 This approach 
assumes that employees desire to act on the basis of these values and 
that they will be motivated to do so if they believe that the organization 
takes them seriously. Management therefore must ensure that rules that 
prescribe behavior are not mere formalities because people in positions 
of authority disregard and show little respect for them. Attention to this 
dimension of organizational life reflects an effort to promote an ethical 
culture that complements and reinforces a firm’s ethical infrastructure. 
While ethical culture is sometimes described more broadly than a focus 
on the values embodied in an organization’s ethical program, for 
analytical purposes, I want to use this term in the narrower sense.  
Based on this account of the evolution of law firm ethics programs, 
we can conceptualize the components that influence ethical behavior as 
nested inside one another. The first level is the individual who engages 
in decision-making, who may receive advice from colleagues who act 
informally to provide ethical guidance. The second level, which provides 
the larger context for the first, is a firm’s ethical infrastructure, which 
attempts in various ways to shape and channel that behavior. The third 
level, which provides the larger context for the first two, is a firm’s 
ethical culture. This can prompt an individual to embrace ethical values 
to which a firm is committed, which provides intrinsic motivation to 
comply with the procedures and policies that make up the firm’s 








                                                          
 4. Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance Through 
Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 973 (2012); Lynn Sharp Paine, 
Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 106, 111.  
 5. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 966-68, 974. 
 6. Paine, supra note 4, at 112. 
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Figure 1 
The ethical culture in a law firm thus provides the larger context in 
which individual action and the firm’s ethical infrastructure operate. 
Ideally, it communicates that a firm is committed to practicing law 
consistently with the values reflected in the professional responsibilities 
of lawyers. While this can be crucial in strengthening ethical behavior, 
there still may be limits to its effectiveness. 
First, members of an organization are more likely to be receptive to 
its ethical culture as they identify more with the organization.
7
 An 
expanded sense of identity more closely aligns individuals’ self-interest 
with that of the organization, so that they see their own success as tied to 
the success of the larger entity. Prompting this identification, however, 
can be a challenge for a contemporary law firm. Most firms are 
extraordinarily fragile, vulnerable to the departure of their most 
profitable partners in the lateral market.
8
 This fragility may make 
partners feel that it is hazardous to act as if their long-term self-interest 
is tied to that of the firm. In addition, competitive pressures now prompt 
many firms to terminate lawyers who are not performing at a level that 
the firm deems adequate.
9
 This heightened vulnerability also can prevent 
the formation of any deep sense of attachment to a firm. 
A second potential limit to the effectiveness of efforts to promote 
an ethical culture is that when individuals in an organization think of 
                                                          
 7. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 975, 978. 
 8. See Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the 
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 73; see also DAVID 
JARGIELLO & PHYLLIS GARDNER, FREE AGENT DYSFUNCTION: MANAGEMENT REALPOLITIK FOR 
U.S. LAW FIRMS 12, 17 (2010). 
 9. See, e.g., JARGIELLO & GARDNER, supra note 8, at 14-15 & nn.15-17. 
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ethics, what tends to come to mind is behavior broader than the type that 
is the focus of an ethics program.
10
 For members of an organization, 
ethics relates most prominently to how fairly the organization treats the 
people who work there.
11
 Research indicates that there is a strong 
connection between this assessment and ethical attitudes and behavior.
12
 
The greater the perception of fairness, the more credible an 
organization’s professed commitment will be to ethical values and the 
more successful it will be in prompting its members to identify with it.
13
 
This directs attention to policies and practices that we may not even 
think of as relating to ethics. They include matters such as promotion, 
compensation, and whether people who are generous or selfish tend to 
get ahead in the organization.
14
 These issues relate to the broader culture 
of an organization, which in turn affects the ability to promote an ethical 
culture. We therefore can conceptualize organizational culture as an 




These components are not necessarily sharply distinct. It is 
possible, for instance, to regard an organization’s ethical infrastructure 
as including its ethical culture.
15
 Professor Christine Parker and her 
                                                          
 10. LINDA KLEBE TREVIÑO & GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 221 (2003). 
 11. Killingsworth, supra note 4, at 975.  
 12. Id. at 978. 
 13. Id. at 975-78. 
 14. Christine Parker et al., The Ethical Infrastructure of Legal Practices in Larger Law 
Firms: Values, Policy and Behaviour, 31 U. N.S.W. L.J. 158, 168-69 (2008). 
 15. Id. at 160. Christine Parker and her colleagues, for instance, argue for “a broader 
conception of ethical infrastructure that incorporates informal management policies and work 
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colleagues suggest, however, that in much of the literature on law firms, 
“[t]he use of the term ‘ethical infrastructure’ . . . has focused on formal 
policies and structures explicitly designed to ensure compliance with 
professional conduct rules.”16 Similarly, it is possible to define ethical 
culture in a way that includes perceptions of how fairly an organization 
treats its members.
17
 Indeed, one important insight is that an 
organization generally does not have a discrete ethical culture that is 
distinct from its overall culture. As Parker and her colleagues 
emphasize: “All management policies, priorities and initiatives – formal 
or informal, and explicitly stated or implicitly assumed – can either 
undermine or support ethical practice within a firm.”18 There is simply 
culture: the complex and sometimes contradictory set of messages that 
an organization sends about what is valued and what is not. 
It can be useful, however, to keep the concepts of ethical 
infrastructure, ethical culture, and organizational culture distinct. Each 
refers to an analytically distinct aspect of an organization’s effort to 
promote ethical behavior. As I will discuss in more detail, each directs 
law firm attention to different types of policies, and each suggests 
different lines of inquiry for scholars.
19
 Research on ethical compliance 
programs, for instance, has distinguished the effectiveness of programs 
that emphasize following rules from those that emphasize commitment 
to values.
20
 In addition, differentiating ethical culture from 
organizational culture underscores that policies, that we normally do not 
think of as related to “ethics,” may have a significant impact on ethical 
                                                          
cultures (not just formal management policies), and the promotion of ethical dialogue and values 
(not just compliance with professional conduct rules).” Id. at 160 n.6. 
 16. Id.; see also, e.g., Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra 
note 1, at 692 (“[P]rofessional regulation increasingly depends on the development of ‘ethical 
infrastructure’ within firms; that is, on organizational policies, procedures and incentives for 
promoting compliance with ethical rules.” (footnote omitted)); Alex B. Long, Focusing Your Firm 
on Ethics: Responsibility for a Culture of Ethical Practice and Behavior, TENN. B.J., Dec. 2009, at 
14, 15 (defining ethical infrastructure as “the organizational structure, practices and procedures a 
firm employs to promote ethical behavior”); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (1991) (“[A] law firm’s organization, policies, and operating procedures 
constitute an ‘ethical infrastructure’ that cuts across particular lawyers and tasks.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Christine Parker & Lyn Aitken, The Queensland “Workplace Culture Check”: 
Learning from Reflection on Ethics Inside Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 399, 401, 441 
tbl.A6 (2011) (including in a survey designed to prompt “individual reflection on the ethical 
cultures” of a firm questions about extent to which some respondents agreed that “I am treated with 
respect and courtesy in my firm”; “I am treated fairly, in a consistent and predictable fashion”; and 
“I am able to openly discuss pay and conditions”); Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and 
Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1999, at 131, 131-32 
(describing “fair treatment of employees” as a “dimension[] of the organization’s ethical culture”). 
 18. Parker et al., supra note 14, at 161. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See, e.g., TREVIÑO & WEAVER, supra note 10, at 193, 211-12. 
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outcomes. Conceptualizing organizational culture in this way 
underscores, for instance, that a lawyer’s decision about whether to 
expose the firm to risk, by deliberately ignoring a potential conflict, may 
depend on whether the firm offers junior lawyers meaningful 
professional training opportunities, and whether it provides income 
partners with guidance on how to engage in business development.
21
 
Thus, while ethical and organizational culture may be inseparable, it can 
be useful to treat them as two distinct cultures within a firm. 
The remainder of this Article uses the concept of nested 
components to chart the evolution of law firm efforts to ensure that 
lawyers comply with their professional responsibilities.
22
 It describes in 
more detail attempts to accomplish this by developing an ethical 
infrastructure and promoting an ethical culture.
23
 It then discusses 
research indicating that an organization’s values broadly defined, 
especially those that its members regard as related to organizational 
justice, can have a significant impact on ethical attitudes and behavior.
24
 
The Article concludes by suggesting that focusing on ethical 
infrastructure, ethical culture, and organizational culture can provide 
distinctive and complementary approaches to promoting and studying 
influences on ethical outcomes.
25
 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF LAW FIRM ETHICS PROGRAMS 
A. Individual Virtue and Informal Advice 
When firms several decades ago were smaller than today and were 
organized as general partnerships, the assumption tended to be that 
informal consultation among partners was sufficient to ensure that 
lawyers in the firm behaved ethically.
26
 Reliance on particular 
individuals for advice evolved gradually as people tended to approach 
certain colleagues for guidance. The system that emerged was informal 
and ad hoc. Partners who developed some expertise in ethics typically 
were not appointed to any formal position.
27
 Nor was there any 
                                                          
 21. See id. at 221-22. 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. See infra Part II.A–C. 
 24. See infra Part II.D. 
 25. See infra Part II.E. 
 26. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 199-20 (2005).  
 27. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics 
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 559, 565 (2002) [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors]. 
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department or committee charged with responsibility for ethical 
compliance.
28
 As one partner put it, the ethics department was “a senior 
partner with a copy of the Model Code in his office.”29 Similarly, when a 
partner who counseled on ethics issues suggested that the firm should 
form a committee, the response tended to be: “What would the ethics 
committee do? It would just rubber stamp everything you say.”30 
Many firms during this period did not explicitly compensate a 
partner who focused on ethics issues for the firm.
31
 They relied instead 
on a partner’s personal and professional commitment to the firm, and 
occasionally on a willingness to volunteer time by partners whose work 
for clients focused on professional liability.
32
 Those who were not 
compensated for their efforts spent perhaps 400-500 hours a year on 
ethics compliance, almost all of which tended to be reactive.
33
 As 
Professor Susan Fortney put it in a 1995 survey of law firm ethics 
programs, firms seemed to be “more inclined to designate individuals to 
handle ethics problems once they arise rather than rely on risk managers 
who might be able to take steps to avoid problems before they arise.”34 
Concern about conflicts generally was the impetus for regular 
attention to ethics issues.
35
 Even committees that were created to address 
ethics compliance tended to be called “conflicts” committees, gradually 
broadening their focus over time to encompass other issues.
36
 There 
often was no formal description of the jurisdiction of a committee.
37
 
Ethics partners tended to chair and do most of the work of committees, 
which in many firms met only rarely.
38
 In addition, membership on a 
committee often rotated, so that other partners had little opportunity to 
build expertise on ethics issues.
39
 Elizabeth Chambliss and David 
Wilkins suggest that this tended to result in lower overall firm 
investment in compliance and greater vulnerability to gaps in coverage 
of issues.
40
 Finally, the titles and status of partners focusing on ethics 
                                                          
 28. See, e.g., id. 
 29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31. See id. at 565, 572. 
 32. Id. at 565, 577. 
 33. Id. at 574. 
 34. Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands unto Themselves? An Empirical 
Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 275-76, 289 (1996) 
[hereinafter Fortney, An Empirical Study].  
 35. Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, supra note 27, at 566. 
 36. Id. at 565-67. 
 37. Id. at 567. 
 38. Id. at 568. 
 39. Id. at 570-71. 
 40. Id. at 571. 
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issues varied considerably.
41
 Chambliss and Wilkins note that a partner 
with this responsibility might be referred to as firm counsel, general 
counsel or attorney to the firm, ethics partner, professional responsibility 




Firms during this period thus tended to focus on individual 
behavior as the main object of concern, with minimal effort to establish 
and enforce standard procedures to coordinate and guide how partners 
conducted their practices.
43
 Fortney’s 1995 survey of Texas law firms, 
for instance, found that most firms did not monitor partners’ compliance 
with internal procedures other than those dealing with conflicts and 
billing.
44
 While a significant percentage of lawyers appreciated the 
advantages of a firm operating as a coordinated unit, rather than simply a 
confederation of independent lawyers, many also expressed concern 
about the danger of organizational procedures intruding on individual 
partner autonomy.
45
 Law firm ethics programs during this period  
thus tended to reflect the notion that ethical behavior of lawyers  
was, as Parker and her colleagues put it, “a matter of individual, 
independent judgment in the specific context of their own clients in their 
own situations.”46 
B. Ethical Infrastructure 
In more recent decades, the growth of law firms, exposure of 
lawyers to more sources of potential liability, and the growing 
complexity of ethical regulation have prompted many firms to establish 
more systematic programs to ensure compliance with ethical rules and 
promote wider awareness of ethical obligations.
47
 These initiatives are 
commonly described as the creation of an “ethical infrastructure,”48 to 
underscore the emphasis on organizational policies and procedures 
designed to impose some regularity on how lawyers in a firm practice.
49
 
Not all firms have responded as comprehensively as others, and the 
                                                          
 41. Id. at 565-68. 
 42. Id. at 565. 
 43. Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 1, at 699.  
 44. Fortney, An Empirical Study, supra note 34, at 284-85. 
 45. Id. at 292-94. 
 46. Parker et al., supra note 14, at 158. 
 47. Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 1, at 702-03, 
710. 
 48. Parker et al., supra note 14, at 172. 
 49. The term appears to have originated with Ted Schneyer. See Ted Schneyer, A Tale of 
Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the “Ethical Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 245, 246, 253, 270 (1998). 
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features of programs vary across firms. Nonetheless, there has been a 
decided shift toward the adoption of measures at the organizational level 
that are aimed at promoting ethical compliance.
50
 
An important component of such an infrastructure is a partner who 
is formally designated as an ethics specialist who is specifically 
compensated for playing this role.
51
 Depending on the firm, this person 
may work on developing standards for matters such as client intake; 
conflicts checks; engagement letters; advance conflict waivers; 
voluntary and mandatory withdrawals from engagements; fee 
negotiations and terms; the provision of opinions on behalf of the firm; 
compliance with practice-specific regulatory regimes; and trading in 
securities to avoid insider trading violations.
52
 The work also involves 
responding to bar complaints, disqualification motions, and lawsuits 
against the firm.
53
 In addition, an ethics partner can serve as someone for 
lawyers to consult with outside the normal supervisory chain of 
command on a matter, which may encourage lawyers to come forward 
about potential problems and cloak such communications with the 
attorney-client privilege vis-à-vis third parties.
54
 
As they have become more systematic, law firm ethics initiatives 
have come to bear some resemblance to corporate legal compliance 
programs. Chambliss and Wilkins explicitly suggested in the early 2000s 
that law firms look to such programs as models of an institutional 
approach to influencing behavior.
55
 As they note, “research on the 
regulation of organizations in other contexts suggests that the 
effectiveness of external regulation depends significantly on the scope 
and effectiveness of compliance procedures within firms. Thus, the firm 
remains the central arena—and agent—of regulation.”56 Compliance 
professionals have played a role in defining “best practices” in various 
industries, identifying risks of liability, and designing organizational 




                                                          
 50. Parker et al., supra note 14, at 178. 
 51. Id. at 179. 
 52. Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, supra note 27, at 566-67; 
Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 1, at 698. 
 53. Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, supra note 27, at 567. 
 54. Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of 
Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 107, 112 (2008). For a detailed description of the 
elements of a law firm’s ethical infrastructure and risk management system, see generally ANTHONY 
E. DAVIS & PETER R. JARVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT: SURVIVAL TOOLS FOR LAW FIRMS (2d ed. 
2007); Davis, supra. 
 55. Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 1, at 693-94. 
 56. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 57. See id. at 706, 715. 
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Indeed, many ethics counsel have come to think of their role mainly 
in terms of risk management.
58
 They typically represent their firms in 
dealings with insurance carriers, which are apt to regard law practice as 
but one of many activities that can pose various types of risks.
59
 As 
Anthony Davis observes: 
[A] key component of all insurance has been the management of risk, 
and the development of systems to improve the management of risk. 
Professional liability insurers have learned that the practice of law is in 
this respect no different than a construction site. Just as insurers 
require construction workers to wear hard hats, they are increasingly 
focused on the adoption by law firms of appropriate risk management 
systems, from client intake through practice management. The 
availability of coverage, the size of deductibles, the limits available, 
the terms of coverage, and the price of malpractice insurance are more 
and more dependent on law firms’ ability to demonstrate to 




Reflecting the shift in focus from the individual to the organization, risk 
management “attempts to put in place a set of standard policies and 
procedures that minimize individual discretion and emphasize uniform 
responses to specific situations.”61 
Law firms that appreciate the importance of establishing an ethical 
infrastructure can look for guidance on best practices to an organization 
such as the Attorneys Liability Assurance Society or other insurers, as 
well as to other law firms. Firms also can adapt the standards for an 
effective compliance and ethics program that are set forth in the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,
62
 and borrow ideas from a 
                                                          
 58. Parker et al., supra note 14, at 179-80. 
 59. Davis, supra note 54, at 100. 
 60. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 61. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1962 (2006). 
 62. The relevant section of the Guidelines states: 
(b) Due diligence and the promotion of an organizational culture that encourages  
ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law within the meaning of 
subsection (a) minimally require the following: 
  (1) The organization shall establish standards and procedures to prevent and detect 
criminal conduct. 
  (2) (A) The organization’s governing authority shall be knowledgeable about the 
content and operation of the compliance and ethics program and shall exercise 
reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness of the 
compliance and ethics program. 
        (B) High-level personnel of the organization shall ensure that the organization 
has an effective compliance and ethics program, as described in this guideline. Specific 
individual(s) within high-level personnel shall be assigned overall responsibility for the 
compliance and ethics program. 
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thriving corporate compliance industry.
63
  
What type of research might scholars pursue in studying law firms’ 
ethical infrastructure? Chambliss and Wilkins lay out some 
possibilities.
64
 They suggest that research should be guided by an 
“institutional” approach to the adoption of compliance programs.65 This 
                                                          
        (C) Specific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-day 
operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program. Individual(s) with 
operational responsibility shall report periodically to high-level personnel and, as 
appropriate, to the governing authority, or an appropriate subgroup of the governing 
authority, on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program. To carry out such 
operational responsibility, such individual(s) shall be given adequate resources, 
appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing authority or an appropriate 
subgroup of the governing authority. 
  (3) The organization shall use reasonable efforts not to include within the substantial 
authority personnel of the organization any individual whom the organization knew, or 
should have known through the exercise of due diligence, has engaged in illegal 
activities or other conduct inconsistent with an effective compliance and ethics program. 
  (4) (A) The organization shall take reasonable steps to communicate periodically 
and in a practical manner its standards and procedures, and other aspects of the 
compliance and ethics program, to the individuals referred to in subparagraph (B) by 
conducting effective training programs and otherwise disseminating information 
appropriate to such individuals’ respective roles and responsibilities. 
        (B) The individuals referred to in subparagraph (A) are the members of the 
governing authority, high-level personnel, substantial authority personnel, the 
organization’s employees, and, as appropriate, the organization’s agents. 
  (5) The organization shall take reasonable steps— 
        (A) to ensure that the organization’s compliance and ethics program is followed, 
including monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct;  
        (B) to evaluate periodically the effectiveness of the organization’s compliance 
and ethics program; and  
        (C) to have and publicize a system, which may include mechanisms that allow 
for anonymity or confidentiality, whereby the organization’s employees and agents may 
report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of 
retaliation. 
  (6) The organization’s compliance and ethics program shall be promoted and 
enforced consistently throughout the organization through (A) appropriate incentives to 
perform in accordance with the compliance and ethics program; and (B) appropriate 
disciplinary measures for engaging in criminal conduct and for failing to take reasonable 
steps to prevent or detect criminal conduct. 
  (7) After criminal conduct has been detected, the organization shall take reasonable 
steps to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct and to prevent further similar 
criminal conduct, including making any necessary modifications to the organization’s 
compliance and ethics program. 
(c) In implementing subsection (b), the organization shall periodically assess the risk of 
criminal conduct and shall take appropriate steps to design, implement, or modify each 
requirement set forth in subsection (b) to reduce the risk of criminal conduct identified 
through this process. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2012). 
 63. See, e.g., Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff: The Culture of Compliance (April 23, 2003).  
 64. Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 1, at 702-05. 
 65. Id. at 702-03. 
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maintains that regulatory provisions and potential liability may not be 
the only factors that determine if an organization creates an ethical 
infrastructure.
66
 Instead, “organizations take their structural cues 
primarily from each other.”67 A company may create an infrastructure if 
other similar organizations have done so, regardless of potential liability, 
or may not establish one, despite exposure to liability, because 
enforcement efforts and internal mechanisms of accountability are 
weak.
68
 Chambliss and Wilkins suggest that the timing of a firm’s 
creation of an infrastructure may provide clues about the reasons that the 
firm adopted it.
69
 Research might focus on which firms have been the 
first to adopt programs.
70
 To what extent have they been subject to 
regulatory scrutiny or liability? Do their clients operate in heavily 
regulated industries? Does the identity of a firm’s insurance carrier 
matter? How do firms learn about what structures are being adopted by 
their peer organizations? 
Research also can attempt to obtain detailed information about the 
elements of law firms’ infrastructures.71 These include features such as 
the scope of its jurisdiction, how frequently it is used, the formal and 
informal authority of the lawyers who manage it, the members of a 
firm’s ethics committee, whether they are elected or appointed, whether 
membership on the committee rotates, if a firm compensates partners for 




Chambliss and Wilkins propose that researchers also consider how 
to evaluate the effectiveness of a firm’s infrastructure.73 What is its 
impact on the daily behavior of lawyers in a firm? One way to gauge this 
is to assess lawyers’ awareness of the infrastructure, the extent to which 
they use it, and their view of its effectiveness.
74
 They acknowledge, 
however, that there are limits to what outside researchers can learn.
75
 
They therefore urge firms to conduct reviews of their programs to 
determine how effectively they are operating.
76
 This would be consistent 
with the provision of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines that 
                                                          
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 703. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 707-08. 
 70. Id. at 708-11. 
 71. Id. at 704. 
 72. Id. at 705. 
 73. Id. at 712. 
 74. Id. at 714. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 715. 
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states that an indication of an effective compliance and ethics program is 
a periodic assessment of its effectiveness, accompanied by revisions to 
address any shortcomings that this process reveals.
77
 
Some have cautioned that conceptualizing ethical issues as matters 
of risk may “put lawyer moral decisionmaking in jeopardy by shifting 
responsibility for hard normative judgments to others inside the firm 
bureaucracy, such as in-house ethics advisors and committees.”78 As 
Anthony Alfieri argues, “[b]y diminishing a lawyer’s individual 
responsibility for making moral choices about his role in law and 
society, firm-devised risk spreading systems may induce a kind of moral 
apathy.”79 Alfieri contends that “the rising dominance of lawyer 
malpractice, loss prevention, and professional liability norms and 
narratives” can “dilute our professional ambitions and traditions, deform 
ethical judgment, and inhibit moral integration.”80 
While we need to keep in mind the potential for this risk to 
materialize, we also need to be careful not to implicitly compare more 
systematic law firm programs coordinated by ethics specialists with, in 
Chambliss’s words, “a nostalgic, collective ideal, in which all partners 
engage in firm management and collective self-regulation.”81 Substantial 
increases in size have made such an ideal unrealistic for many law firms, 
and numerous studies establish the crucial role of an organizational 
environment in influencing individual behavior.
82
 Furthermore, as 
Chambliss suggests, more robust management controls can expand 
awareness of ethical obligations and make them more salient in the 
deliberations of individual lawyers.
83
 
C. Ethical Culture 
Another concern about law firm programs that emphasize risk 
avoidance and compliance with a more elaborate set of rules is that they 
may foster a utilitarian approach in which individual conformity to 
ethical responsibilities depends on a cost-benefit calculation.
84
 This is 
the approach to the law of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “bad man, who 
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cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables 
him to predict,”85 rather than the substantive values that the law 
expresses. For someone with this perspective, compliance with ethical 
and legal provisions is a matter not of acknowledging inherently 
normative obligations, but primarily a means of avoiding penalties. 
Research on corporate compliance initiatives indicates that a 
program can trigger this instrumental orientation if it fails credibly to 
emphasize the substantive values that the program is designed to 
vindicate.
86
 Such a program will elicit only provisional and contingent 
compliance, and may even undercut its basic objective on encouraging 
ethical behavior.
87
 Aggressive monitoring of employee behavior, for 
instance, may lead employees to develop an adversarial attitude toward 
an organization that undermines motivation to follow rules and 
guidelines. In addition, it may subtly affect employees’ perceptions of 
their own motivation for compliance, attributing it to a desire to avoid 
sanctions, rather than their own desire to behave ethically or in 
compliance with the law. This can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy that 
leads employees to violate rules when the probability of detection or the 
expected penalty is low. 
A program also can undercut compliance because of the implicit 
signal it may send to employees about the behavior they can expect from 
their colleagues.
88
 If the program relies heavily on monitoring and 
sanctions, it may send the message that people generally cannot be 
trusted to act appropriately on their own. The expectation that others are 
likely to act in their own self-interest may prompt individuals to behave 
this way in self-defense, and to frame situations in terms of what 
behavior will best further their own interests. 
These concerns lead researchers on corporate programs to 
differentiate between a “compliance-based” approach and a “values-
based” approach.89 The former “focuses primarily on preventing, 
detecting, and punishing violations of the law,” while the latter “aims to 
define organizational values and encourage employee commitment to 
ethical aspirations.”90 As Paine describes, organizations that emphasize 
values promote a conception of ethics: 
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as a driving force of an enterprise. Ethical values shape the search for 
opportunities, the design of organizational systems, and the decision-
making process used by individuals and groups. They provide a 
common frame of reference and serve as a unifying force across 
different functions, lines of business, and employee groups. 




Paine suggests that, while corporate counsel may be involved in 
designing and implementing this type of compliance program, 
management of an organization plays the most critical role in ensuring 
that employees internalize ethical values and are intrinsically motivated 
to behave in accordance with them.
92
 
A values-based program will necessarily rely to some degree on 
policies and procedures that are designed to prevent, detect, and penalize 
behavior inconsistent with ethical and legal obligations. If, however, the 
organization credibly communicates a genuine commitment to ethical 
values and the importance of appropriate behavior for its own sake, 
“compliance activities can be perceived as part of an overall system of 
support for ethical behavior. Without a strong emphasis on values 
orientation, however, compliance activities might be perceived to be part 
of a system aimed only at detecting misconduct” because management 
does not trust its members to act in accordance with ethical obligations.
93
 
The combination of the two approaches ideally means that when 
individuals have to make decisions that are unlikely to be monitored by 
the compliance system, they will be guided by appreciation of the 
importance of affirming ethical values, not simply of complying with 
ethical rules to avoid punishment. 
This research thus underscores that an effective compliance 
program requires that an organization promote an ethical culture, not just 
that it prescribe to a set of rules and procedures with which individuals 
must comply.
94
 While it is possible to conceptualize ethical culture as a 
component of an organization’s ethical infrastructure, the two often are 
treated as distinct. A focus on ethical culture sweeps more broadly than 
the rules and procedures that many regard as constituting a firm’s ethical 
infrastructure. It illuminates the informal ways in which an organization 
deliberately or unwittingly reinforces or undermines its professed 
commitment to ethical behavior. 
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How might a law firm take into account research on the importance 
of an ethical culture? Parker and her colleagues suggest that a firm with 
an ethical culture should promote: 
 Awareness and understanding of individual lawyers of:  
o Their own personal values;  
o The range of different approaches to ethical decision-
making; 
o The standards set out in the rules and law on professional 
conduct (trying to follow the rules is just one approach to 
ethical decision-making);  
o Their own preferred ethical approach (‘ethical position’);  
o Day-to-day situations where ethical issues may arise; 
o Informal signals in legal practice of the risk of unethical 
conduct; and,  
oThe ability to identify them when they occur.
95
  
An ethical culture also supports the “capacity and willingness by 
individual lawyers to: Discuss their own ethical position with others in 
the firm; Seek to understand the ethical position of others within the 
firm; Make a judgment about competing ethical positions in complex 
situations; and Act on that judgment.”96 In addition, a firm with an 
ethically supportive culture encourages all firm members to discuss with 
their colleagues ethical questions about work in the firm.
97
 It regards 
such discussion as valuable, and it ensures that no one who raises ethical 
concerns faces recriminations.
98
 A firm also should not regularly permit 
partners to successfully appeal decisions by its ethics counsel, and 
should ensure that profitable partners who violate ethical standards are 
not able to avoid penalties for their behavior. 
Attention to ethical culture suggests a set of research questions that 
are distinctive from, although complementary to, those that are 
associated with the study of ethical infrastructure more narrowly 
defined. These may include, for instance: Have you ever been asked by a 
client to do anything about which you feel uncomfortable? If so, have 
you raised your concern with someone in the firm? What was the 
response? Who decides whether taking on a matter would create a 
conflict of interest with another client? How much do ethical 
considerations influence that decision as compared to business concerns? 
Have you ever seen colleagues behave in ways that you regarded as 
ethically problematic? Did anyone in the firm raise any concerns about 
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that? How narrowly do lawyers in the firm tend to construe a discovery 
request when the issue is whether a troublesome document must be 
produced to an opponent in litigation? How has the firm responded when 
its lawyers have been found to violate ethical rules? Such questions are 
designed to determine, to borrow a phrase from Roscoe Pound, “how 
much the law in action [is consistent with] the law in the books.”99 
One example of research that focused explicitly on ethical culture 
in law firms is the Workplace Culture Check conducted by the Legal 
Services Commissioner in the state of Queensland in Australia.
100
 This 
consisted of a survey of individuals in fifteen law firms in Queensland 
that posed questions about lawyers’ awareness of the availability of 
systems and resources for ethical support in their firms.
101
 It asked for 
assessments of whether lawyers are encouraged to raise ethical issues, 
whether they personally feel that they have the capacity to do so, and 
whether the firm responds appropriately when someone raises an 
issue.
102
 Among the questions that the survey included were how 
strongly lawyers agreed or disagreed with the following statements: 
  I am able to discuss ethically complex dimensions of my work with 
partners/senior members of the firm 
  I can talk with others in my firm about the ethical bases of decisions 
we make or actions we take 
  I am able to raise ethical issues in confidence 
  If I raise concerns, they are given consideration 
. . . . 
  I am able to express honest opinions on issues that may have 
serious consequences if others disagree 
. . . . 
  When a conflict arises I know that I will not be under pressure to 
put the firm’s interests ahead of the client’s 
. . . . 
  I know where to turn for ethical advice in my firm 
  I know who can make a decision on the best course of action if an 
ethical issue arises for me in my work 
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Directing attention to ethical culture thus underscores the 
importance of fostering a commitment to the professional values that 
underlie a formal compliance program.
104
 In a myriad of ways, an 
organization, such as a law firm, communicates to its members how 
seriously it regards such values. That message must be consistent with 
formal rules for individuals to internalize those values and develop an 
intrinsic motivation to behave according to them.
105
 Ethical culture, in 
other words, must reinforce ethical infrastructure. 
D. Organizational Culture 
Assessing a firm’s ethical culture tends to focus, for the most part, 
on the extent to which a firm sends a clear message about the importance 
of lawyers complying with their professional obligations in addition to 
legal provisions that are applicable to everyone.
106
 Such professional 
obligations generally are set forth in ethical rules, in agency regulations 
in some areas of practice, and in common law standards of behavior.
107
 
They relate to duties to clients and to the legal system, and also establish 
limits on how far lawyers can go in vigorously representing their 
clients.
108
 An effective ethical culture serves to reinforce a firm’s 
expectation that its lawyers fulfill these duties, ideally enhancing  




For individuals to be receptive to an organization’s ethical culture 
and to use it as a guide to behavior, however, they must feel some 
meaningful sense of connection to the organization.
110
 As Scott 
Killingsworth puts it: 
  When membership in a group is important to us, we identify 
positively with the group, forming an emotional commitment to it; we 
internalize the group’s values, expectations and norms (or, in a larger 
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group, its culture), we become intrinsically motivated to adhere to the 
values and expectations that we have internalized, and we govern our 
behavior within the group by those norms.
111
 
Law firms may find it especially difficult to establish this sense of 
connection on the part of their members. As Parker and her colleagues 
observe: “The increasing degree of mobility in the upper end of the legal 
profession – that is, how quickly experienced lawyers move in and out 
of the firm – makes it difficult to transmit a positive ethical culture 
throughout a whole firm.”112 Some of this mobility is voluntary, but 
some of it reflects law firm termination of lawyers who are not meeting 
productivity targets.
113
 This risk of being let go can make individuals 
reluctant to identify with and make a commitment to a firm.
114
 
Findings thus far on a research project on which I am working with 
a colleague suggest that an important influence on lawyers’ sense of 
connection to a firm is their perception of the firm’s broad cultural 
values.
115
 These values come into play with respect to various types of 
behavior that go beyond compliance with the ethics rules. They involve 
matters such as sharing billing credit, stepping aside to avoid a business 
conflict, mentoring junior lawyers, and sharing clients.
116
 Behavior 
relating to these issues contributes to a sense of how fairly members of 
the firm treat each other, and the extent to which the firm attempts to 
encourage such fairness through compensation decisions and other forms 
of recognition and support.
117
 This, in turn, affects the extent to which a 
lawyer identifies with the firm.
118
 
A firm may adjust a partner’s compensation, for instance, based on 
how generous or selfish he or she is in sharing origination credits with 
others.
119
 It may reward someone who is willing to relinquish a matter or 
a client to avoid a conflict by resolving the next business conflict in his 
or her favor.
120
 It may give compensation credit for time spent mentoring 
junior lawyers, and may penalize or reward a partner based on his or her 
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willingness to share work for a client with other partners.
121
 It may work 
with a lawyer to arrange a schedule that permits him or her to meet 
family responsibilities or to deal with health challenges.
122
 All of these 
measures may convince a lawyer that it is safe to act cooperatively 
toward the firm and others in it, which can help create a culture to which 
people feel a strong connection.  
Research on employees’ attitudes toward ethics and compliance 
programs is consistent with these findings.
123
 It indicates that support for 
such programs is significantly affected by the perception of an 
organization’s overall culture, not simply its ethical culture.124 As Tom 
Tyler observes, “people are motivated to align their behavior with the 
rules of organizations or groups they belong to when they view those 
groups as being legitimate and consistent with their own sense of right 
and wrong.”125 
Especially important in this process is the assessment of how fairly 
the organization treats its members.
126
 In making this judgment, 
employees use a “broad fairness heuristic” to evaluate what Linda 
Treviño and Gary Weaver call an organization’s “overall fairness 
climate.”127 This takes into account the fairness of how organizational 
rewards are distributed: whether people are treated fairly and with 
respect.
128
 These assessments relate to fair outcomes and to fair process, 
respectively. Reliance on a fairness heuristic reflects the fact that when 
employees focus on ethics they tend to think first of how the 
organization treats its members.
129
 As Tyler declares:  
[P]eople who experience justice when dealing with their work 
organization first think that its rules are legitimate and ought to be 
obeyed. They also feel that the values of their work organization are  
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more congruent with their own, so that their own motivation to behave 
morally leads them to support their work organization.
130
  
Thus, the broad values expressed by the organization’s overall culture, 
not simply those embodied in its ethics program, can be critical in 
prompting ethical behavior. 
Why are people’s attitudes toward ethics programs affected by their 
perception of how fairly an organization treats its members? Weaver and 
Treviño note that social cognition theory suggests that people tend to 
store information in general categories, which they use to “interpret 
incoming information and to retrieve information from memory.”131 The 
ethics category is likely to hold information relating to concepts such as 
justice, fairness, rights, and obligations.
132
 When an organization directs 
attention to ethics, “this is likely to cue a cognitive connection with the 
ethical issues that are salient to employees, such as fairness in hiring, 
promotion, performance appraisal, pay, [and] restructuring.”133 
An organization that treats its employees unfairly on these and 
other matters provokes skepticism that it is genuinely committed to the 
values expressed in its ethics program.
134
 Individuals who feel such 
skepticism will be reluctant to identify with an organization because they 
fear that it may take advantage of them.
135
 As Weaver and Treviño 
describe this process: 
People must make decisions concerning the extent to which they will 
constrain their own interests and identity in light of the interests and 
welfare of the organization or other collective to which they belong. 
Exhaustive consideration of all relevant information is impossible in 
the context of real world relationships between individuals and 
organizations. Thus, people inevitably rely on judgmental heuristics to 
determine whether to entrust their interests and identity to the 
organization and align their goals and behavior with the organization. 
Among the factors affecting this decision, fairness concerns appear to 
function preeminently. The “fairness heuristic’’ is sufficiently 
powerful as to constitute a “pivotal” cognition affecting persons’ 
attitude and behavior toward organizations or other collectives.
136
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An organization that treats people fairly communicates to its 
members that they will incur minimal risk from conforming to 
organizational expectations.
137
 It also gives them a sense that there is “no 
need to balance the scales of justice by looking for opportunities to 
improve their own outcomes at the organization’s expense.”138 
Individuals feel that they are valued and that the organization respects 
them. As a result, their commitment to the organization can serve as an 
important way in which they maintain their identities and further their 
interests. Perception of this linkage between individual and 
organizational welfare makes it likely that members will take the 
initiative to engage in acts of organizational citizenship that go beyond 
what their jobs formally require. 
The importance of judgments of organizational justice to 
commitment to ethics programs underscores the importance of 
integrating ethical concerns with the full range of organizational 
activities.
139
 Programs that are created in response to regulation or public 
pressure sometimes are treated as self-contained functions that have little 
connection to organizational practices relating to planning, budgeting, 
personnel policies, and other matters.
140
 This is problematic because, as 
Weaver and Treviño put it, “an ethics program raises the profile of 
fairness issues in general (whether or not those issues are explicitly 
addressed in the ethics program).”141 It therefore “becomes more 
important to see that the ethical ideals are integrated across all 
organizational functions.”142 
Researchers suggest that increased involvement of human resource 
departments in corporate ethics management is especially important.
143
 
These departments generally deal with the issues that employees see as 
ethically salient, such as fair hiring, promotion, performance appraisal, 
compensation, and the like.
144
 Perceived fair treatment is closely linked 
to ethics in employees’ minds because of the “natural cognitive 
association between discussions of organizational ethics and information 
employees hold in memory about justice, fairness, and 
rights. . . . [A]lthough organizational structures may separate ethics 
management from human resources, employees do not.”145  
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Research by Treviño and Weaver on more than 15,000 employees 
in companies with ethics or compliance programs in place analyzes the 
link between perceptions of organizational justice and the amount of 
observed unethical behavior in an organization.
146
 Components of the 
former variable included the extent of agreement or disagreement that: 
the company treats employees fairly, employees think of the company as 
fair, rewards are allocated fairly, employees are rewarded fairly, people 
get rewards or punishments they deserve, supervisors treat employees 
with dignity and respect, employees can count on being treated with 
courtesy and respect, consistent ethical behavior helps someone advance 
in firm, and people of integrity get rewards in the firm.
147
 Examples of 
unethical behavior included actions that “might harm the organization or 
increase the employee’s inputs,” such as padding expense accounts, 
taking longer than necessary to do a job, concealing errors, falsifying 
reports, and lying to supervisors.
148
 The study also examines the 
relationship between perceived fair treatment and the extent to which 




As Treviño and Weaver report: “A key study finding was the strong 
relationship between perceived general fair treatment and ethics-related 
outcomes. . . . [A] broad spectrum of unethical actions was significantly 
lower if employees believed that their organization generally treated 
people fairly.”150 In addition, perceived organizational justice 
contributed to a willingness to deliver bad news to management.
151
 This 
is consistent with the idea that perceived justice and injustice can be a 
powerful motivation for behavior. A perception of justice moves 
employees to reciprocate with helpful behavior, while a perception of 
injustice arouses feelings of anger and resentment toward the 
organization, and can lead to covert attempts to balance the scales in the 
individual’s favor.152 
This study reinforces the need for ensuring that the overall values 
expressed by organizational policies and decisions are consistent with an 
organization’s professed commitment to ethical behavior as reflected in 
its compliance program. Treviño and Weaver note: 
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Ethics programs generally are administered separately from other 
human resource programs and practices. Therefore, ethics program 
administrators have little influence on employees’ broader evaluations 
of organizational justice. Yet it is the broader justice evaluations that 
had the most powerful separate influence on key outcomes in this 
study, explaining 30 percent of the variance in observed unethical 
conduct and 52 percent of the variance in reporting. . . . This suggests 
that ethics/compliance management should be more tightly coupled 
with the management of the broader organizational culture to improve 
employees’ perceptions of fairness in the organization in general and 
in the ethics/compliance program.
153
 
The perception of fair treatment incorporates notions of both 
distributive justice—fair outcomes—and procedural justice—fair 
process.
154
 Assessment of outcomes reflects the judgment that people 
receive what they deserve, based on conceptions of desert that are 
appropriate to specific types of decisions.
155
 Assessment of process takes 
into account both how decisions are made, and, more generally, whether 
people are treated with dignity and respect.
156
 
Research on procedural justice indicates that people assess the 
fairness of the process by which decisions are made separately from the 
outcomes that result from that process.
157
 Those who do not receive an 
outcome that they desire may nonetheless accept it as legitimate if they 
regard the process that produced it as a fair one.
158
 Tyler suggests that 
judgments about procedural justice are influenced by an assessment of 
four different components of an organization’s process.159 The first is the 
quality of the decision-making, which focuses on decision-maker 
neutrality, the objectivity of decision-making and the extent to which it 
is based on factual findings, and whether rules are consistently 
applied.
160
 The second is the quality of people’s treatment by authorities 
in the organization.
161
 This involves the extent to which individuals are 
treated with courtesy and dignity, and with a concern for their rights.  
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People identify with organizations that make them feel respected, 
listened to, trusted, and valued.
162
 
An organization can communicate information about the quality of 
its decision-making and the quality of its treatment of individuals in two 
ways. One is through formal sources such as the rules and structures of 
the organization and its statements about values. Thus, an organization 
may have a formal grievance procedure that enables employees to 
present complaints, as well as a statement that persons participating in 
that process are to be treated with respect and that their concerns are 
treated seriously.
163
 A second source of information about procedural 
justice is an employee’s experience with supervisors.164 Persons in 
positions of authority are constrained to some degree by formal 
procedures and policies, but typically have some discretion in how they 
apply them in particular cases. Thus, as Tyler observes: “The same 
decision-making procedure can be implemented either in a way that 
emphasizes the dignity of those involved or in a manner that treats 
employees rudely or dismissively.”165 
Individuals make assessments of each of the four components of 
procedural justice independently of the favorability of particular 
outcomes.
166
 Tyler and Steven Blader’s “group engagement” model 
suggests that this is because these assessments provide information that 
is relevant to individual decisions about the desirability and risk of 
drawing a sense of identity from membership in an organization.
167
 
Groups can provide people with a way of constructing a social identity, 
thereby shaping “people’s definitions of themselves and their feelings of 
well-being and self-worth.”168 At the same time, identification with a 
group can make one vulnerable to negative experiences that damage 
identity and self-esteem.
169
 The group engagement model argues that, 
“to the degree that people feel that the group makes decisions via fair 
procedures, they are more likely to feel that their identity can be safely  
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and securely merged with that of the group.”170 In this way, procedural 
fairness provides a form of “identity security.”171 
This occurs because a fair decision-making process provides 
assurance that decisions will not be based upon stereotypes or personal 
prejudices.
172
 In addition, treating people with respect in making 
decisions and in other interactions communicates that a person is valued 
by others in the organization.
173
 This communicates information about 
one’s status within the organization and allows for inferences about the 
nature of his or her connection to it in the future. The identity security 
provided by fair process strengthens a sense of connection to the 
organization, which in turn enhances willingness to cooperate and abide 
by organizational rules and policies.
174
 
In sum, research indicates that employees’ embrace of an 
organization’s ethics and compliance program depends on their 
judgments about the extent to which the organization acts in accordance 
with broader values to which employees subscribe.
175
 Whether the 
organization is perceived as treating its members fairly is an especially 
important consideration.
176
 This includes providing people with the 
rewards that they deserve, engaging in a decision-making process that is 
uniform and neutral, and treating people with dignity and respect.
177
 An 
organization that does so signals that an individual can safely derive at 
least part of his or her identity from connection and commitment to the 
organization.
178
 This sense of connection motivates an individual to 
cooperate with the organization on matters such as abiding by its rules 
on ethics and legal compliance.
179
 As Scott Killingsworth puts it: “In 
essence, when managers say ‘ethics,’ employees hear ‘fairness.’”180  
E. Organizational Fairness and Law Firms 
What are the implications for law firms of the connection between 
ethical outcomes and overall firm culture? Most fundamentally, 
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awareness of this connection makes clear that what might seem to be 
solely “business” or “human resource” decisions, which do not relate 
directly to lawyers’ professional responsibilities, may nonetheless have a 
significant impact on attitudes and behavior that do.
181
 These decisions 
may involve matters that affect perceptions of organizational fairness.
182
 
They also may relate to matters such as developing a new practice area, 
opening an office in a new location, or determining how well the firm 
integrates laterals into its operations and culture. This means that firms 
must be sensitive to the ethical risks that any given decision may create. 
One way to enhance sensitivity to such risks is to conceptualize the 
role of law firm general counsel more expansively than many firms 
currently do. Responsibilities are divided in different ways in different 
firms. Some assign responsibility for professional ethics to the general 
counsel; others assign this responsibility to ethics counsel, with the 
general counsel playing a broader role as lawyer for the firm.
183
 It is 
unclear, however, even in the latter firms whether the general counsel is 
regarded as part of the top management team who weighs in on the 
potential legal risks of strategic and operational decisions. This is the 
trend in corporate legal departments, where general counsel advise at 




Deloitte’s 2011 Global Counsel Report, for instance, indicates that 
two-thirds of Chief Legal Officers or senior inside counsel said that 
corporate counsel are “now a member of the senior 
management/executive team,” compared to 47% who said this five years 
earlier.
185
 Some 42% of global respondents said that corporate counsel is 
involved in strategy development, compared to 24% five years ago.
186
 
The percentage was even higher among U.S. counsel, with 51% stating 
that this is the case, in comparison to 35% who said so five years 
before.
187
 Regulatory compliance and risk management were the two 
most prominent responsibilities of corporate counsel, cited by 75% and a 
little over 60% of counsel, respectively.
188
 Similarly, former Delaware 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Norman Veasey and Christine Di 
Guglielmo’s recent book on the role of the Chief Legal Officer observes 
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that “[g]eneral counsel perform the increasingly important function of 
assessing legal risks and translating those risks into business terms in 
order to facilitate decision-making concerning those risks.”189 
Given the increasing legal risks to which law firms are subject, law 
firm general counsel arguably should be playing a similar role with 
respect to legal risk and compliance. Such risks arise from regulation 
under state ethical rules; court rules; common law standards of liability; 
some specialized regulation applicable to particular practice areas, such 
as banking, securities, and tax law; and generally, civil and criminal 
statutes such as those relating to consumer fraud and money-laundering, 
respectively.
190
 Appreciation of the impact of organizational culture on 
attitudes and behavior suggests that law firm general counsel should 
have a seat at the table at least for discussions about the legal risk that 
may be created by firm strategy, policies, and important business 
decisions. There also may be an argument that law firm general counsel 
should play a role in advising on enterprise risk more broadly, but that is 
a subject beyond the scope of this Article.
191
 
With respect to research, positing a connection between 
organizational fairness and support for ethics programs is generally 
consistent with the research we have conducted to date on our law firm 
culture project.
192
 Lawyers do tend to refer to matters beyond 
compliance with ethics rules when they discuss behavior within the firm 
that they regard as having ethical significance.
193
 This behavior can 
involve sharing compensation credit; taking time to mentor junior 
lawyers; participating in pitches to prospective clients; helping out 
colleagues who encounter personal or professional emergencies; 
stepping aside to avoid an ethical or business conflict that would prevent 
the firm from representing a significant client; and spending time on 
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firm citizenship activities such as serving on the compensation or 
executive committee, investing time in developing a new practice area, 
opening an office in a new location, and helping devise a new training 
and evaluation system for associates or a new compensation system for 
partners.
194
 The extent to which a firm encourages and recognizes such 
behavior may have a powerful effect on its members’ perception that the 
firm treats people fairly. So may a firm’s willingness to help lawyers 
balance work and family responsibilities, deal with health problems, or 
rebuild their practices in response to market changes.
195
 How a firm 
compensates incoming laterals also can affect judgments about how 
fairly it treats its members.
196
 
Research that focused on these and similar issues could enrich our 
understanding of the ability of law firms to promote ethical behavior by 
their lawyers. At the same time, this research may need to take account 
of some distinctive features of law firms and the legal profession. As I 
have mentioned, one phenomenon that research on overall law firm 
culture may need to consider is that creating and sustaining a sense of 
connection to the organization is especially difficult in a law firm 
because of the fragility of many of these entities.
197
 Rainmakers—
lawyers who have close relationships with lucrative clients—can easily 
move from firm to firm.
198
 Their allegiance to any particular firm may be 
primarily instrumental, dependent on the support that the firm provides 
for the development and expansion of their practice.
199
 This sense of 
connection is contingent and unstable, and may not generate motivation 




Furthermore, lawyers who are not rainmakers may fear that they 
will be laid off if the firm’s financial performance declines.201 This 
perception that the firm will not be loyal to them can lead them to regard 
their own interest as distinct from that of the firm, and to place priority 
on pursuing it. It thus may be difficult for a firm to encourage these 
lawyers to develop a strong sense of connection to the firm and to 
internalize professional values that may constrain self-interest. 
Another challenge for firms is that many lawyers exhibit some 
distinctive personality traits that can make it especially difficult to 
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encourage them to develop a strong commitment to a firm.
202
 One is an 
especially strong desire for autonomy, on which lawyers tend to score at 
close to the ninetieth percentile.
203
 This inclination is reinforced by a 
strong tradition of individual lawyer independence.
204
 Many lawyers 
tend to guard their autonomy jealousy and bristle at anything they 
perceive as outside interference that makes them feel like employees. 
They may be quicker than others to regard firm efforts to inculcate a 
particular culture as efforts to control their behavior, which can lead 
them to treat the firm with some suspicion. 
Lawyers also tend to rank high on skepticism and low on trust.
205
 
As David Maister suggests, lawyers “are selected, trained, and hired to 
be pessimistic and to spot flaws.”206 This means that many of them may 
be especially likely to look for self-interest in others, and to question 
others’ statements and motives.207 This can make it hard to convince 
lawyers that it is safe to identify with the firm and that their cooperation 
will be reciprocated. Lawyers also tend to be less concerned than the 
average person with building and maintaining relationships with 
others.
208
 Many prefer to work in solitary concentration.
209
 This may 
make them less interested than others in being a part of a cooperative 
venture, and in developing a strong connection to a firm. Maister argues 
that “the combination of a desire for autonomy and high levels of 
skepticism make most law firms low-trust environments.”210 
It also may be worth exploring the ways in which law firms are 
different from other organizations with respect to the connection 
between fairness assessments and support for ethics programs. Research 
on ethics in the corporate context implicitly assumes that employees who 
do not feel a sense of connection to a corporation must fall back on their 
own personal values in determining how to behave in the work 
setting.
211
 That is, they must do without the added support for those 
values that identifying with the company could provide. Without this  
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assistance, their values could be vulnerable to pressure from self-interest 
or animosity toward the organization. 
Lawyers who do not identify with a firm, however, might still 
identify with the legal profession and its ideals.
212
 Deriving a sense of 
identity from being a member of the profession could reinforce personal 
values and make them less vulnerable to being overridden than if an 
individual had to rely on those values alone. It might provide a source of 
motivation to support a firm’s ethics program that is not dependent on 
identification with the firm. If so, a commitment to abide by ethics rules 
might exist despite a lawyer’s perception that the firm does not act fairly 
towards its members on other issues. 
One complication of this account is that the meaning of ethical 
rules is intertwined to some degree with a law firm’s approach to 
practice.
213
 Rules are fleshed out as they are applied in specific 
circumstances, and a firm may communicate a distinctive interpretation 
of their meaning through the accumulation of interpretations by its 
members over time. The extent to which a lawyer develops a practical 
understanding of his or her ethical obligations thus may be dependent on 
the degree to which the lawyer identifies with the firm. If this is so, a 
lawyer who identifies only minimally with a firm may not have a robust 
conception of the rules that will provide much useful guidance. In any 
event, it might be worthwhile to explore the extent to which professional 
identity provides a source of motivation beyond personal values that is 
not available to other employees. 
An additional potentially relevant difference between law firms and 
other organizations is that many firms tend to have a more decentralized 
authority structure than the typical business corporation.
214
 While firms 
are moving toward more centralized management, it is still necessary for 
managers to negotiate with and attempt to gain support from others in 
the firm in order to adopt any significant policies.
215
 Lawyers in a firm, 
especially partners, therefore may view the organization less 
monolithically than do employees in corporations. Relationships with 
other lawyers may be highly important, and the extent to which an 
individual regards colleagues’ values as congruent with his or her  
own may vary considerably across the lawyers with whom he or she  
has contact. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
I have framed my analysis as a tale of two cultures in order to 
underscore the distinctive implications for law firms and scholars of 
distinguishing between ethical culture and organizational culture.
216
 In 
practice, of course, they are not so sharply separate. The overall culture 
of an organization sends messages about what is and is not valued with 
regard to a number of matters.
217
 Many of these may affect ethical 
attitudes and behavior, even though they seem on the surface not to 
relate to what we think of as “ethical” issues.218 Law firm management 
therefore needs to be sensitive to the potential ethical implications of a 
wide range of practices, procedures, and decisions.
219
 It may be tempting 
to conceptualize ethics and business issues as occupying separate 
domains. The lives that people live, however, are more integrated than 
this imagery suggests. Appreciating the nested relationships among 
ethical infrastructure, ethical culture, and organizational culture provides 
a more useful way of understanding the complex influences that shape 
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